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Commentary on State Selection of

Judges
By BRADLEY C. CANON*
The American people face a fundamental dilemma about
what they want their judges to be. The dilemma has existed
since the early years of the republic and it is likely to be with
us well into the future.
We want judges to be independent, but not too independent.
We expect a judge to apply the rule of law in a case regardless
of the political party, the ideology, or the class which the litigants might represent, directly or indirectly. This defines a judge
for us: someone who identifies with no group, advances no
interest, prefers no particular policy, and has no ties to the
litigants at the bar. A judge applies that specific yet amorphous
concept known as "the law" to all alike, without fear or favoritism.
Yet Americans recognize that law and politics cannot be
dntirely separated. Law is public policy, and public policy is
what politics is all about. When judges make rules of common
law, construe statutes, or interpret constitutions, they are making
policies, and it is natural in political systems based on democratic
principles to expect that policy-makers should have some mandate from the people to do this, or in some way be accountable
to voters. In short, we do not want judges who are spineless
politicians following the whims of every transient majority or
helping to whip up the passions of the day. But neither do we
want judges whose devotion to logic or principles is so great
that they are quite disdainful of the actual consequences their
decisions have on society.
Since 1787 most of our efforts to resolve this dilemma satisfactorily-to have our cake and eat it too, so to speak-have

* Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky; B.A., Florida State
University; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, Madison.
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focused on the methods by which judges are selected and retained. Americans seem to believe implicitly that it is possible
to develop a selection system that will screen out judicial candidates whose future behavior or policies may be inappropriate
(however we define that term). We also implicitly believe that,
once in office, judges' behavior can be controlled by various
retention methods. The selection system for federal judges is, of
course, embedded in the Constitution and has remained constant
over 200 years. There have been serious efforts to amend the
Constitution in this respect but none have been successful.
At the state level, however, we have altered selection and
retention methods whenever sufficient dissatisfaction arises over
judges' performance in the current system. In the Jacksonian
era, direct partisan election of judges was adopted to counter
the perceived aristocratic dominance of the bench. By the Progressive Era, the perception that many judges were little more
than party "hacks" led many states to switch to a non-partisan
ballot for electing judges. During the last three decades, rising
skepticism that voters could distinguish able judicial candidates
from mediocre ones caused many states to adopt the so-called
"merit plan" (sometimes called the "Missouri Plan").' The
merit plan approach can make for some wonderful tinkering
because the plan has several variations. Moreover, the variations
can be combined with partisan or nonpartisan elections or with
2
that original method, gubernatorial appointment.
The papers presented in this section of the Symposium address three important aspects of this dilemma as it has become
focused in the debates over how best to select judges. The
symposium papers by Professor Baum3 and by Professors Alfini

For a thorough history of changes in state selection systems until the merit plan
HAYNrs, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES (1944). For
the history of the merit plan, see Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and
Tenure: Its Historical Development in G. WNTrm, SELECTED READINGS ON JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND TENURE 29 (1973). For a brief overall history, see H. STUMPF, AMEIUCAN

began to win adoptions, see E.

JUDIcIAL

PoLIncs (1987), ch. 5.

In three of the original states, judges have been elected by the legislature for
two centuries. Three others retain gubernatorial appointment. These states have largely
been immune from the shifting trends of state judicial selection systems. H. STUMPF,
supra note 1, at 160.
1 Baum, 645, 77 Ky. L.J. Voters' Information in Judicial Elections: The 1986
Contestsfor the Ohio Supreme Court (1988-89).
2
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and Brooks 4 ask questions about how well the nature of the
electoral process comports with meeting the twin, if somewhat
incompatible goals, of independence and accountability. Professor Davidow5 goes further and proposes a novel method of
selecting judges, one which he believes will better achieve these
two goals than the systems now in use.
Baum asks, in essence, whether the voters have sufficient
information to cast meaningful votes in judicial elections and he
approaches the answer empirically. His data are for one supreme
court election in one state, and he clearly recognizes their limitations as well as the complexities of the question. Nonetheless,
I infer that he leans toward a "yes" answer, especially when his
findings are considered in conjunction with similar research on
the same question. 6 He says that it may well be unrealistic to
hold voters to a higher informational standard in judicial races
than they have in elections for other offices with similar visibility. When judges decide cases in a partisan or ideological manner, or when major questions arise about a particular judge's
behavior or character, the election process will often generate
sufficient information for citizens to cast meaningful votes. When
these factors are absent, voters may cast ballots almost blindly,
but it doesn't matter very much-just as it doesn't matter that
they cast votes almost blindly for state treasurer or county jailor.
Of course, to say that judicial elections work reasonably well
insofar as voters receive minimal information is not to say that
elections are the best method of obtaining judges who will be
both accountable and independent. Certainly Baum makes no
comparisons here. But others do make comparisons, and over
the last twenty years or so a body of literature has developed
that argues that judicial elections are better able to achieve this
balance than are other selection systems, particularly the merit
plan which has gained considerable popularity over the last three
4

Alfini & Brooks, Ethical Constraintson JudicialElection Campaigns:A Review

and Critique of Canon 7, 77 Ky. L.J. 671 (1988-89).
1 Davidow, The Search for Competent and Representative Judges, Continued, 77
KY. L.J. 723 (1988-89).
6 See, e.g., Baum, Explaining the Vote in Judicial Elections: The 1984 Ohio
Supreme Court Election, 40 WEsT. POL. Q. 361 (1987); Dubois, Voting Cues in NonPartisan Trial Court Elections: A MultivariateAssessment, 18 L. & Soc'Y REv. 395
(1987); Johnson, Shaefer, & McKnight, The Salience of Judicial Candidates and Elections, 59 Soc. Sc. Q. 371 (1978); McKnight, Schaefer and Johnson, Choosing Judges:
Do the Voters Know What They're Doing?, 62 JuDicATuRE 94, 96 (1978-79).
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decades. 7 One can draw from Baum's data an argument that
elections do hold incumbent judges more accountable, at least
when they have engaged in highly visible behavior. To test this
argument, we must compare the findings of Baum and others
against research into the merit plan's retention system, which
centers on retention elections.8 We know that very few incumbent
judges are defeated in these elections, and usually voters have
little information because there is no opposition candidate or
campaign. 9 Nonetheless, the 1986 defeat of Rose Bird and two
of her colleagues on the California Supreme Court tells us that
retention elections can serve at times to hold judges accountable.
Professors Alfini and Brooks present an in-depth study of
court decisions and judicial or bar ethics commission opinions
about what candidates for elected judgeships can and cannot do
in terms of raising funds, taking policy positions, and advertising
in furtherance of their candidacy. The underlying question here
is: To what extent, if any, can we have candidates for judicial
office campaign like politicians and still retain, in both reality
and appearance, the independence necessary to be a judge? Any
serious degree of democratic accountability requires the use of
the electoral process, but to a greater or lesser extent, judicial
candidates must behave like politicians if they are to win elections; this is part of the very nature of elections. In trying to
achieve both accountability and independence, we have had to
draw up a series of detailed and often, complex boundary lines
between the competing goals. These boundary lines vary almost
bewilderingly from state to state. Alfini and Brooks do not tell

P. DUBOiS, FROM BALIOT TO BENCH: JUDIcIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABrITY (1980) advances the longest and most forceful argument in favor of
elections. See also Grossman, A Political View of JudicialEthics, 9 SAN Dmoo L. REv.
803 (1971-72); Mullinax, Judicial Revision: An Argument Against the Merit Plan for
Judicial Selection and Tenure, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 21 (1973-74).
8 After completing a term, a judge runs against his own record. The ballot
questions reads something like: Should Judge X be returned to another term on _
Court? If a majority of the electorate votes no, the seat is declared vacant and the
judicial nominating commission selects candidates to replace Judge X.
9 On retention elections, see Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are They
Serving Their Intended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 211, 221 (1980-81); Hall and Aspin,
What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDIcATURE 340
(1986-87); Jenkins, Retention Elections: Who Wins When No One Loses?, 61 JUDICATUBE 79, 80 (1977-78).
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us to what extent particular states have been successful in these
efforts but they do make us realize that the process is not an
easy one. In this respect we are justified in at least considering
alternate selection and retention systems.
Alfini and Brooks' research supports the basic assumptions
that fuel the opposition to judicial elections. It is assumed, for
one thing, that judges cannot accept large campaign contributions without becoming indebted to the contributors or the interests they are promoting. Why would big oil companies
contribute hundreds of thousands of dollars to candidates for
the Texas Supreme Court if they did not expect to keep or gain
influence therefrom? If it is necessary to conduct real campaigns
to win a judgeship, judges will be more accountable to and less
independent from the interests that enabled them to conduct
such a campaign than to the public generally. The second assumption is that judicial candidates who take campaign positions
on issues or make substantive promises compromise their independence too much; that such campaign commitments seriously
weaken their ability to serve the cause of justice. These are
powerful arguments against putting judges in the electoral arena.
They are leavened some by the reality that the majority of
judicial contests feature only one candidate, and in those with
more than one, the candidates usually run low-level, dignified
campaigns.
But this reality could be slowly disappearing. An impression
grows that both more expensive campaigns and an appeal to
economic interests or ideological politics are a more frequent
and public aspect of judicial campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s
than they were in earlier times, particularly when incumbent
judges are concerned. 0 If this is the case, the inevitable conclusion is that the election of judges will too often produce judges
who inherently cannot satisfy the requirements of both accountability and independence-and sometimes cannot satisfy either
of them. Even if judicial electoral contests are not becoming
more politically visible and expensive, the occasional contests
10There is no

aggregate research bearing on this assumption. In addition to Alfini

and Brooks on Texas and Baum on Ohio, see a description of California judicial politics
in Cochran, Why So Many Judges Are Going Down to Defeat, CAL. J. 359-60 (Sept.
1980). More generally, see L. BAuM, AmiEic~A CouRTs: PRocEss AND POLiCY 98 (1986).
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that are in that mode arguably render judicial elections suspect.
Professor Davidow carries us back to a system that bears
some resemblance to the merit plan. But it is a distant cousin
of such plans. It is concerned less with the merits of the judges
than with their representativeness. The focus is not on the judges
singly, but in the aggregate. He has carefully devised a system
to obtain representation from broad segments of the community
on the nominating commissions and independent judges at the
end of the process-thus achieving both accountability and independence. The most interesting feature of Davidow's proposal
comes in the pains he takes to obtain whole community representation, not simply that of the political majority." He designs
a proportional representation system to ensure that minority
views are represented by membership on the nominating commission. The commission itself operates on a veto system reminiscent of John C. Calhoun's political theories about the voice
of major interests in the body politic. To cap it off, judges will
serve a fixed fifteen-year term and be ineligible for reappointment.
Although I find Davidow's proposed system very provocative, I believe that the system has some theoretical and practical
implications that require serious consideration. One is the election of the nominating commission through a scheme of proportional representation. Proportional representation is far more
analogous to legislative bodies than it is to juries. While juries
are structured to represent the community as a whole, we do
not believe that members of Group X or Group Y are entitled
to sit on any particular jury, or even on juries as a whole in
proportion to their numbers in the community. And certainly,
every effort is made to discourage jurors from thinking of themselves as representing Group X or Y when deciding a case. Jurors
are expected to represent the community directly; they are not
expected to speak for groups to which they happen to belong.

" The unrepresentative nature of the judicial nominating commission has long
been an object of debate. Merit plan defenders argue that its whole purpose is to
represent the more capable elements of the public and bar, while critics argue that it is
biased against women, racial and ethnic minorities, less prestigious portions of the bar,
etc. See generally H. SnnspF, supra note 1, at 153-72. See also A. Asrsm N AND J.
AMNu, Tan KEY To JuDIciAL MERIT SELECTION: Tim NoMaNATiNa PROcess (1974).
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Legislators, by contrast, are expected to represent only a portion
of the community. In those elected by proportional representation, legislators act only in the interests of the slate that put
them up. Such a system serves more to enhance and solidify
divisions than to ameliorate them, and it often paralyzes making
or enforcing decisive public policy. Because the United States
lacks clear ideological or racial/ethnic divisions (except for blacks
and whites), and because creating or perpetuating them is alien
proportional representation is not
to our notions of community,
12
used in this country.
Second, the benefits of electing members of the nominating
commission are not very clear. Almost certainly these elections
will have low public visibility; they will be accompanied by all
the drama that we see in races for state utilities commissioners.
If exceptions occur, they will almost always signify strong ideological or partisan divisions. The judicial selection process now
becomes a two-step procedure, but it is still one where the vast
majority of voters lack any information about the candidates or
at best may cast their votes on the basis of simple political cues.
This is what now occurs in states with judicial elections. All that
we have gained is some likelihood of having more "minority"
representation on the commissions.
Minority is a contextual word. Davidow uses the example of
a racial minority, blacks in particular. There are, of course,
other racial and ethnic minorities as well. There are also political
and ideological minorities, and there are legal interpretive minorities that may be relevant to the selection of judges. We are
as likely to get a ticket of candidates organized by plaintiffs'
attorneys as a black slate or a Jewish slate. 3 Indeed, six or eight
slates might end up vying for two or three positions on the
commission. Could we structure the nominating commission
membership into half, third, or quarter votes to make it truly
12

Of course I approve of Davidow's provision for special representation on the

nominating commission for non-lawyer members of the faculty in the state universities.
However, I would add one refinement. Agronomists, mechanical engineers, English
professors, etc., know very little about judicial selection, so I would restrict these
university seats on the commission to political scientists.
'1 This already occurs when the bar elects some members of judicial nominating
commissions. See R. WATSON AND R. DOWNING, THE PoLITcs OF THE BENCH AND THE
BAR 19-48 (1969).
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reflect the philosophy of proportional representation? Put otherwise, I doubt we can obtain a very meaningful system of
proportional representation on a nominating commission of six
members.
I fear that there will be at least two undesirable consequences
of a proportional representation, Calhounian veto system such
as Davidow proposes. For one, to the extent it encourages input
into the process of selecting judges, that input will be severely
factionalized. If this happens frequently, the bar and the public
will soon come to look upon the law as nothing more than the
outcome of base and immediate political machinations, just as
it is when Congress passes a Rivers & Harbors Act or fiddles
around with the tax code. Every group gets its piece of the legal
pie and the devil takes the hindmost. It is, I think, deleterious
to the concept of universally applicable law and to the cause of
the impartial administration of justice to encourage, let alone
facilitate, such a view of the judicial process.
Second, if unanimity is necessary to put a nominee on the
list of possible judges, the process will soon degenerate to selecting nominees of the lowest common denominator. Good
candidates, who are often good because they stand for something, will be vetoed and eventually will refuse to allow their
consideration. It is doubtful that the likes of Louis Brandeis,
Matthew Tobriner, Richard Posner or Thurgood Marshall would
have been on any nominating commission's list if a unanimous
vote had been required to put them there. We will have a bench
of judges chosen because they have taken very few stands and
thus have no enemies. Any exceptions will attain the bench
through a more or less public political trade. ("We will give you
one of your folks if you give us one of ours.")
Although I disagree with some goals and consequences of
Davidow's proposed selection system, it is amenable to further
discussion. It is not a fixed system. He offers it in several
variations, and remains open to working out the details.
Debate about what kind of selection system can best achieve
a balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability will no doubt continue well into the future. A lot of
tinkering and revising will accompany it. Tinkering and revising,
and even wholesale innovation, is one of the purposes of the
American states, our 200-year-old political and legal laborato-
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ries. Of course, state experimentation with systems for selecting
judges is very unlikely to affect the federal system, but experiments that seem to work well can, if history is any guide, diffuse
rapidly to other states.
Indeed, my heretical thought is that there is no best system
that will establish the elusive balance between judicial independence and accountability. I believe that the degree to which a
given selection system balances these twin demands is time-bound
and perhaps also limited geographically. The way a newly adopted
system functions tends to change over time. For example, in an
earlier era, elections probably attained the balance better than
did the main alternative, gubernatorial appointment. 14 But as the
distribution of information about candidates went from passing
out handbills and door-to-door campaigning to expensive and
virtually issueless thirty-second television spots, candidates for
low visibility office win (especially in primaries or non-partisan
elections) because they are incumbents, have memorable names,
or because they raise the money for TV spots or full-page
newspaper advertisements. Those elected are less accountable
and, if they had to raise a campaign war chest, are perhaps less
independent. As Alfini and Brooks discuss, when judges have
to compete in elections, the tension between pressure to engage
in "real" campaigns and the norm of complete judicial independence has produced a "twilight zone" in judicial ethics,
although judicial ethics commissions and state supreme courts
are slowly, if not always consistently, reducing this "zone." As
discussed earlier, this tension is one reason that many states have
abandoned judicial elections. Abandoning elections in this era
almost automatically means choosing a variation of the merit
plan.'5 But currently, dissatisfaction with the merit plan is on
the upswing because it exacerbates divisiveness in the bar or

14 In actuality, probably over half of the judges on state elective courts first
attained the bench by gubernatorial appointment to fill a vacancy. See Herndon, Appointment as a Means of InitialAccession to Elective State Courts of Last Resort, 38
N.D.L. REv. 60 (1962); B. HENDERsoN AND T. SiNcLAu, TJE SEuEcrioN oF Juinoas IN
TEXAS 21 (1965). Even so, the judges had to face re-election and thus may have felt

more accountable to the public than if they had not been subject to re-election.
" See Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial
Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MuI

L. REv. 509, 509-10 (1977-78).
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because governors can often "rig" the appointment process.16
At some point in the future, it is likely that a number of states
will shift away from the merit plan. Before doing so, however,
states' plans will probably undergo adjustments and tinkering,
especially because there are two or three versions of the merit
plan.
Geography can matter. For example, Professor Davidow's
system with its core value of ensuring minority representation,
would be less applicable to homogeneous states such as Nebraska
or Vermont than to heterogeneous ones like New York or California. Sometimes, geography may not matter. The behavior
and policies of judges may reflect the political culture of a state
rather than its selection system. Intuitively, I suspect that no
matter what system a state such as Louisiana choses, politics in
the more banal sense of the term would be a large factor in
both the process of choice and the outcome of policy. Conversely, regardless of selection system, base-level politics would
7
play a highly reduced role in Wisconsin.
The advocacy of a judicial selection system is only meaningful if there is reason to believe that the system is more likely to
produce judges with certain policy preferences or behavior patterns than are the other systems. No selection system now used
or proposed is capable of giving us more than educated guesses
about how judicial candidates will behave or what policies they
will prefer after donning the black robes. Selection systems, in
short, are instrumental to legal and political ends, and those
concerned about the matter may change positions over time as
they analyze the character and decisions of the judges the system
has produced, or those of judges chosen by other systems.
Although there may be no "best" system for selecting judges
in any universal sense, it does not follow that we should stop
pursuing the Holy Grail and choose our judges randomly. There
are "wrong" systems-those that make no effort at balancing

16 See R. WATSON AND R. DowNiNG, supra note 13; P. DUBoIS, supra note 7, at

258-59.
17 For data pointing in this direction, see Atkins and Glick, Formal Judicial
Recruitment and State Supreme Court Decisions, 2 Am. POL. Q. 427 (1974); Canon,
The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristicsof Judges-Reconsidered, 6 L. & Soc'Y REv. 579 (1971-72).
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accountability and independence or those that seem incapable of
vetoing judicial candidates who are obvious risks. States have
been tinkering with and occasionally making major alterations
in their systems for selecting judges since they were admitted to
the Union. They will likely continue this process and should be
encouraged to do so. The Grail of perpetually balanced judicial
accountability and independence will never be found, but we
should not abandon the search.

